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Abstract Over the last years, considerable attention
has been given to the privacy of individuals in wireless
environments. Although significantly improved over the
previous generations of mobile networks, LTE still ex-
poses vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit. This
might be the case of paging messages, wake-up noti-
fications that target specific subscribers, and that are
broadcasted in clear over the radio interface. If they
are not properly implemented, paging messages can ex-
pose the identity of subscribers and furthermore pro-
vide information about their location. It is therefore
important that mobile network operators comply with
the recommendations and implement the appropriate
mechanisms to mitigate attacks. In this paper, we ver-
ify by experiment that paging messages can be captured
and decoded by using minimal technical skills and pub-
licly available tools. Moreover, we present a general ex-
perimental method to test privacy exposure by LTE
paging messages, and we conduct a case study on three
different LTE mobile operators.
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1 Introduction
Long-Term Evolution (LTE) is the fastest developing
mobile network technology of all times, commercially
launched by more than 670 operators worldwide, and
with an estimation of up to 700 until the end of 2018
[14]. In these circumstances, disclosure of private infor-
mation in LTE brings important consequences, both for
4G as a standalone technology, but also because 4G is
a main pillar for the coming 5G [16,32,31]. Although
it is significantly improved over the previous genera-
tion networks, LTE still exposes vulnerabilities that can
easily be exploited by an adversary to break the pri-
vacy of subscribers. Examples include IMSI catchers,
active devices that masquerade genuine base stations
with the purpose of stealing the permanent identity of
subscribers. This makes LTE vulnerable to location at-
tacks such as testing the presence or absence of a sub-
scriber in an area [33,17,24,25]. Another example is
the one we address in this paper: privacy exposure of
subscribers by paging messages. Paging messages are
wake-up messages sent by the network to a device to
notify it of an event, such as a call or data reception.
They are broadcast messages targeting a specific sub-
scriber, so they need to contain a sort of identification.
Because paging messages are broadcasted prior to the
establishment of a secure communication channel, the
identification string they contain is sent in clear. As-
suming implicit trust in pre-secured communication is
a problem in nowadays mobile networks [16,32]. Hence,
to some extent, paging messages can expose private
information. Unlike IMSI catching, paging related at-
tacks are mostly passive, so they are more difficult to
detect and mitigate. The current 3rd Generation Part-
nership Project (3GPP) standardisation fails to imple-
ment countermeasures for paging attacks in LTE, and
so there is a strong motivation to study of paging mes-
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sages and related attacks. Moreover, by exploiting iden-
tity leakage, paging attacks relate to a well known is-
sue in mobile communications, the private identifica-
tion problem, or how to securely send the identification
string over the network so that it remains secure against
unauthorised parties [23]. Motivated by all the above-
mentioned aspects, the paper presents an experimen-
tal method to test at what extent the paging messages
expose the privacy of subscribers, and propose a case
study on three mobile operators.
1.1 Related Work
Shaik et al. proposed a solution to intercept LTE broad-
cast channels, collect and decode paging messages [33].
The implementation heavily relies on a Universal Soft-
ware Radio Peripheral (USRP) and the open source
software srsLTE, and it exploits specification and imple-
mentation vulnerabilities in LTE. Additionally, they ex-
plained semi-passive attacks for triggering paging mes-
sages to a specific subscriber by using social applica-
tions such as Facebook and WhatsApp. Similar work
on analysing paging messages in commercial networks
was done in the past for GSM networks [18].
Security vulnerabilities introduced by paging mes-
sages in LTE have been signalled many times in the
literature [38,37,36,17,19,15,9]. Paging messages can
be used to trigger Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks by
simply planting a phone in a targeted area to respond
all paging messages and ignore further communication
[38]. Another way to induce DoS attacks is by jam-
ming, and work has been done to analyse and diminish
the problem [37,19]. LTE has also been shown vulnera-
ble to IMSI disclosure and location exposure by paging
[36,9]. Solutions that claim to enhance the privacy of
identifiers in paging messages and mitigate location dis-
closure have been proposed [15,36]. Applications that
detect threats in mobile networks are currently avail-
able online, but they mostly do not support paging de-
tection. Park et al. conducted an analysis for GSM and
UMTS and found one Android application that mon-
itors paging messages and triggers an alert when the
paging message contains the permanent identifier of the
subscriber (IMSI) [30]. Bojic et al. give a brief overview
on the evolution of IMSI paging attacks from 2G/GSM
to 4G/LTE [9].
1.2 Contribution
The vulnerabilities exploited in the last years show that
there is still much space left for improvements in LTE
with respect to privacy. This paper focuses on privacy
exposure caused by LTE paging, and extends the ex-
isting work in the sense that it describes in detail an
experimental method to test the privacy of subscribers
in LTE networks. The experiments are all feasible with
open source software, publicly available low-cost hard-
ware and basic technical skills. They consist in captur-
ing and analysing paging messages with respect to the
identity of subscribers. Motivated by Shaik et al.’s re-
mark that some network operators tend to not change
the temporary identifiers [33], we also investigate how
the temporary identifiers are used and refreshed. Fi-
nally, we introduce a method to verify if smart paging
is implemented in an LTE network. All experiments are
explained in sufficient detail, so that the procedures can
be easily replicated.
Following the experimental method described, we
conduct an experimental study on three different mo-
bile operators in Norway: Telenor, Telia and ice.net. We
present the results, analyse the data and discuss the
findings. Overall, the paper pertains to LTE in general.
The choice of election for the operators is only given by
the geographical location of the authors.
1.3 Outline
The paper is organised as follows. Next section gives
the necessary background on LTE. Section 3 introduces
an experimental method for testing the privacy of sub-
scribers’ identity in LTE mobile networks. Section 4
presents and discusses the results of an experimental
study conducted for the three Norwegian mobile oper-
ators. Last section concludes.
2 Background
3GPP developed LTE with the aim to increase down-
link and uplink peak data rates, create scalable car-
rier bandwidths, and make a purely Internet Protocol
(IP) based network architecture [1]. In addition to the
significant functionality improvements, the security ar-
chitecture has also been enhanced in comparison to its
predecessors. This section reviews the overall LTE ar-
chitecture, with focus on the subscribers’ identifiers and
paging messages that are directly used in our work.
2.1 LTE Architecture
The LTE network architecture is roughly divided into
the access part called the Evolved Universal Terrestrial
Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) and the core part
called the Evolved Packet Core (EPC). The E-UTRAN
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Fig. 1 LTE network architecture [24]
and EPC are themselves divided into several network
components, each playing an important role in the com-
plete LTE network architecture. Figure 1 illustrates the
LTE architecture. We briefly summarise the network
components next.
User Equipment (UE) is the mobile terminal of the
user. It consists of the Mobile Equipment (ME) such
as a phone or a tablet, equipped with a card provided
by the network operator, called Universal Subscriber
Identity Module (USIM)1.
Evolved Node B (eNodeB) is the base station respon-
sible for the LTE radio functionality, being the access
point of the UE to the network. Each eNodeB serves
a coverage area, which is divided into several sectors
known as cells [33]. Multiple cells group in Tracking
Areas (TAs), with a TA being managed by a single
MME.
Mobility Management Entity (MME) is a key control
plane entity within the EPC, providing an interface to-
wards the E-UTRAN. The primary responsibility of the
MME is to manage the accessibility of network connec-
tions, allocate network resources, and authenticate UEs
[34].
Home Subscriber Server (HSS) is essentially a database
containing subscriber-related information such as the
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), au-
thentication key, quality of service profile, and roaming
restrictions [13,20]. The identities will be explained in
more detail in the next section.
1 More precisely, the circuit card is known as the Universal
Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) or Subscriber Identity Mod-
ule (SIM), while the Java application running on top of it is
known as Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) [10];
however, this level of details is not important for our current
work, and it is popular in the literature to refer to USIM as
including both hardware and software.
PDN Gateway (P-GW) is the interconnection node with
external packet data networks such as the Internet.
Serving Gateway (S-GW) is the interconnection node
between the EPC and the E-UTRAN anchor point for
intra-LTE mobility.
2.2 LTE Identifiers
To access mobile services, a UE must successfully au-
thenticate itself to the network by following an Authen-
tication and Key Agreement (AKA) procedure. AKA is
mainly based on a static shared identification string and
a cryptographic key that are unique for each subscriber
and are stored in the USIM at the user side and in
the HSS at the network side. The permanent identifica-
tion is called International Mobile Subscriber Identity
(IMSI).
To maintain the privacy of the subscribers, the IMSI
should be exposed as rarely as possible. To fulfill this,
mechanisms to protect the permanent identity by al-
locating temporary identities are used. Global Unique
Temporary Identity (GUTI) is a unique temporary iden-
tity allocated to the UE by the MME. GUTI iden-
tification is unambiguous and prevents the disclosure
of the permanent identity IMSI at eavesdropping. The
GUTI update interval is operator-specific and may vary
among network operators. Figure 2 shows the complete
structure of the GUTI [2]. The last part of the GUTI
forms the SAE-TMSI (S-TMSI), which identifies the
MME in the network by the MME Code (MMEC) and
the UE by the MME Temporary Subscriber Identifier
(M-TMSI). For UEs that camp in cells under the same
MME, MMEC is the same, and only the M-TMSI dif-
fers. The M-TMSI, or equivalently the more complete
identification S-TMSI, are important for our work, be-
cause they temporarily identify a subscriber. The M-
TMSI is also stored (and refreshed) at both ends (user
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Fig. 2 The structure of GUTI
side and visiting network side, the network to which the
UE camps on). GUTI also contains the Mobile Country
Code (MCC) and Mobile Network Code (MNC) that
together uniquely identify the mobile operator world-
wide, and the MME Group ID (MMEGI), which is an
identifier for a group of MMEs in the network. They all
compose the Globally Unique MME Identifier (GUM-
MEI), which fully identifies the MME that allocated
the GUTI.
2.3 LTE Paging
Paging is a Radio Resource Control (RRC) procedure
used by LTE networks to notify one or more UEs of
an event [4]. UEs are monitoring the paging channel
to detect incoming calls, system information change,
or other notifications such as for example Earthquake
and Tsunami Warning System (ETWS) [5]. The paging
messages identify the UEs by their temporary identity
S-TMSI, which populates the ue-Identity field. Only
the addressed UEs respond to the paging message. To
avoid network congestion and increase efficiency, the
operators page multiple UEs in a single message when-
ever this is possible. In this case, a single paging mes-
sage contains more paging records, one for each paged
UE. Figure 6(b) shows an example of a paging mes-
sage decoded in xml format with a single paging record.
Similarly, systemInfoModification is a field indicat-
ing that system information changes at the next mod-
ification period boundary, while etws-Indication in-
dicates a ETWS notification [5].
Traditionally, a paging message is broadcasted in
all cells of a TA. With smart paging enabled, the net-
work pages a UE only in the last cell on which the
UE camped and maybe the neighbour cells [29]. Only
if the UE does not reply, the paging message is after-
wards broadcasted in the whole TA. Even if it is not
completely certain that a paged UE is indeed located
in the paged cell, the probability is high, so smart pag-
ing decreases the amount of paging messages sent in the
network and hence increases performance. On the other
hand, it makes location tracking by eavesdropping more
accurate. With smart paging enabled, a subscriber can
be located within the coverage area of one cell, typically
of two km2, instead of the whole TA which is typically
100 km2 [33].
3 Experimental Method
This section presents an experimental method for test-
ing the privacy of subscribers’ in commercial networks.
All experiments are feasible to implement with open
source software and publicly available hardware, and
they can be fully reproduced following the described
methodology.
3.1 Tools
We start by describing the software and hardware tools
necessary to conduct the experiments.
3.1.1 srsLTE
srsLTE is an open source platform developed by Soft-
ware Radio Systems for configurating Software Defined
Radio (SDR) network components such as UEs and eN-
odeBs [35]. The software is implemented in C, and it
is compatible with the LTE Release 8 specification, de-
fined by 3GPP [35,3]. srsLTE contains multiple pre-
built example applications based on UE and eNodeB
specifications. Implemented applications of interest for
our work are cell search, which provides a list of neigh-
bouring LTE cells together with their frequency and
pdsch ue, which behaves as a UE and provides mea-
surement data of commercial LTE cells, catches and
decodes paging messages.
3.1.2 Ettus B200mini
Ettus B200mini is a Universal Software Radio Periph-
eral (USRP) manufactured by Ettus Research, intended
to be a low-priced device for universities, research labs,
and hobbyists [27]. The B200mini utilizes a wide fre-
quency range (70MHz - 6GHz), which allows operation
on all frequency bands in GSM, UMTS, and LTE [11].
B200mini’s small size makes it portable and physically
hard to detect. It is conveniently bus-powered by USB
3.0 connectivity, which allows it to be operated from
anywhere with the help of a portable battery pack.
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Fig. 3 Experimental architecture
3.2 Experimental Setup
The experimental setup consists of a personal com-
puter running srsLTE, attached with SDR and anten-
nas. srsLTE software runs on the computer to collect
the paging messages broadcasted by a commercial eN-
odeB on a given frequency. For our experiments, we
used a desktop computer running Ubuntu 14.04 LTS,
version 3.19.0-031900-low latency kernel, Inter Core i7
and Ettus B200mini USRP equipped with Pulse Elec-
tronics W1900 antennas [8]. The Ettus B200 mini USRP
board only, respectively the board equipped with enclo-
sure (manufactured locally at NTNU) and antennas is
given in Figure 4. For testing the persistence of tempo-
rary identities, we used an iPhone, running iOS version
10 equipped with commercial USIMs belonging to the
targeted commercial networks. Any equipment that ac-
cepts the commercial USIM and has the facility of dis-
playing the M-TMSI can be used with success. Figure
3 illustrates the schematic experimental architecture.
(a) USRP B200mini [11]
(b) USRP B200mini equipped
with enclosure and antennas
Fig. 4 USRP equipment
3.3 Methodology
The current subsection describes the methodology used
to conduct the experiments. Figure 5 summarises the
major steps, which are described in more details next.
The lower branch (A-D) is only used for testing the
persistence of temporary identities, while all the other
experiments are following the upper branch.
A. Experimental setup
Experimental setup consists in the acquisition of
necessary hardware, and the installation and configu-
ration of the software. The experimental architecture
is illustrated in Figure 3 and explained in the previ-
ous subsection. More information about the tools and
equipment was given in Subsection 3.1.
B. Data capture
To proceed with capturing the data after the ex-
perimental setup is complete, the frequency of interest
must be determined. This is a downlink frequency used
by the target network to send paging messages to UEs
in the area of the experiment.
B1. Determine cell frequency
There exist multiple ways to determine the down-
link frequency of an operator in the measurement area.
The simplest method is to use a mobile phone that dis-
plays the Evolved Absolute Radio Frequency Channel
Number (EARFCN) as parameter (either by running a
built-in code or accessing advanced networks configu-
ration from the menu) [24]. However, this is device and
OS-specific, and the exact steps to access the informa-
tion might change in time because of updates. Another
possibility is to use srsLTE and search for cells in the
area of the experiment using cell search:
$ ./ cell search -b <freq band>
Cell search receives as parameter a frequency band
<freq band>, scans it and displays all the discovered
cells operating in the input band. The frequency band
allocated to operators is public. For example, the fre-
quency band in the university area is available online
on the Norwegian National Telecommunication Author-
ity [28]. Mapping the scanned cells to operators can
be easily done by a lookup in the frequency allocation
reports of the European commission [12]. Of course,
the same resource can be used to determine the fre-
quency band too. Alternative solutions include inter-
cepting and decoding System Information Block (SIB)
messages, which offer additional information such as the
priority of selection in case of multiple overlapping cells
[25].
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Fig. 5 Schematic methodology applied for this work
B2. Capture paging messages
Once the targeted downlink frequency <dl freq> is
known, the srsLTE prebuild application pdsch ue can
be used to capture paging messages:
$ ./ pdsch ue -f <dl freq> -r fffe
The eavesdropped cell is automatically selected in
the given downlink frequency. When there are two or
more cells running on the same frequency in the cap-
ture area, the cell with the stronger signal strength is
selected. The value fffe is a fixed value for Paging-
Radio Network Temporary Identifier (P-RNTI), which
(a) ASN.1 hexadecimal encoding
(b) XML format after decoding
Fig. 6 Paging message decoded using an online tool [21]
identifies paging and system information change notifi-
cation [7].
C. Data processing
After the paging messages are captured, the data
has to be decoded to a human easily readable format,
which further permits automatically extraction of in-
formation and analysis.
C1. Decode paging messages
Decoding of paging messages is performed in two
steps. First, a C code embedded in srsLTE decodes the
paging message from Physical Downlink Shared Chan-
nel (PDSCH) to Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)
hexadecimal format. This step is in fact performed di-
rectly by the tool during the message capture. Then,
the ASN.1 format is translated to readable Extensible
Markup Language (XML). Figure 6 illustrates a decod-
ing of ASN.1 to XML using a free online tool [21]. How-
ever, for bulk decoding, we wrote a customised Python
script that uses the external library libmich [22] and
further used it in our experiments.
C2. Process the data to extract information
Once in XML format, the data can be easily anal-
ysed. For example, a simple search on M-TMSI would
reveal the presence of the temporary identity in the
capture file. Simple customised scripts must be used in
this phase to extract the information of interest from
captures.
D. Persistence of M-TMSI
To test the persistence of the temporary identifier
M-TMSI, a different methodology is applied. This is
because there is no need to capture and decode paging
messages. The steps to conduct the experiment follow
the lower branch (A-D) in Figure 5. In the experimental
setup phase, the UE is connected to the commercial
network. The M-TMSI is then read before and after an
event is triggered or after a pre-defined period of time.
The M-TMSI is given by the last 4 bytes of the EPS
Location Information field. The field is accessible on
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Fig. 7 M-TMSI read from the EPS Location Information on
iPhone, iOS version 10
iPhone with iOS version 10, by dialling *3001#12345#*
and identified by ef id 28643 [6] . Figure 3.3 illustrates
step-by-step how to find the M-TMSI. A more com-
plex alternative to find the M-TMSI is to trigger paging
messages to the UE, capture, decode them and read the
M-TMSI. This can be done by techniques similar to the
ones given by Shaik et al. [33].
4 Results and Discussion
Following the method described in Section 3, we con-
ducted an experimental study to analyse the subscribers’
privacy for three mobile operators in Norway: Telenor,
Telia and ice.net. The experiments were performed in
the wireless security lab at NTNU for educational and
research purposes, and without disclosing any private
information about commercial subscribers.
First, we analysed paging messages with respect to
two criteria: type of paging messages (Section 4.1) and
type of subscribers’ identity contained in the paging
messages (Section 4.2). Then, we tested the behaviour
of a commercial subscriber in different scenarios with
respect to identity protection by usage of temporary
identifiers (Section 4.3). Last, we verified if smart pag-
ing is implemented in the operators’ network (Section
4.4).
4.1 Paging Messages
All captures were performed during working hours, un-
der similar conditions. The experiment has been per-
formed several times, for different frequencies in the
area of the wireless security lab at NTNU, with similar
results.
For each operator, the number of captured paging
records during three one-hour period samples are sum-
marised in Table 1. In total, a significant number of
records were captured from Telenor, the largest mo-
bile operator in Norway and one of the world’s largest
mobile telecommunication company. Based on subscrip-
tions in first half 2017, Telenor has 48,8% of the Norwe-
gian market share, Telia 34,7%, ICE 6,4%, and others
10% [26]. We consider this to be a reason for the large
number of paging records, in comparison to the other
operators.
Most of the captured paging messages in this exper-
iment contain paging records only. For Telenor, some
systemInfoModification messages were captured too.
It is not illustrated in Table 1, but expectedly, none of
the messages had etws-Indication enabled. Although
the notification messages are not of direct significance
for the experiment, it is of interest to differentiate the
messages that contain paging records and will be used
for further analysis.
4.2 Identity of Subscribers
The captured messages were used to check the type of
identity the network operators use for paging. For the
conducted experiment, all paging records contain the
temporary identifier M-TMSI. No IMSIs were found.
This means that the operators successfully preserve the
confidentiality of the permanent identity with respect
to its presence in the paging messages. They are com-
pliant to the standards, in the sense that they use tem-
porary identifiers to protect the permanent identity of
their subscribers.
For completeness, Table 2 contains the total number
of paging messages, the number of paging messages that
contain more than one paging record and the total num-
ber of paging records. Note that for all operators, there
are paging messages with more than a single paging
record. The percentage of messages that contain mul-
tiple identities is 12,17% for Telenor, followed by Telia
with 7,12% and ice.net with 3,93%. As already noted,
all identities used for paging are temporary M-TMSI.
4.3 Persistence of Temporary Identities
The usage of temporary identities is just a first step
in protecting the privacy of the subscribers. If they are
kept unchanged for a long time, their functionality is
drastically reduced. This is because a subscriber can be
easily identified and located by the temporary identity,
without the necessity of knowing the permanent iden-
tity. So, changing the temporary identity often enough
is a simple measure to mitigate attacks. This motivates
the testing of the persistence of the temporary identi-
ties in different scenarios. More precise, we test under
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Table 1 Number of paging records, captured within one hour at different times of a week
Network Cell PHYID, Time Number of Number of
operator frequency paging records syst.modif.
15.Jan.2018, Mon
08:43:19 - 09:43:19 65058 -
Telenor 112 18.Jan.2018, Thu
816.0 MHz 16:54:32 - 17:54:32 43642 -
19.Jan.2018, Fri
10:22:45 - 11:22:45 72743 115
15.Jan.2018, Mon
09:49:35 - 10:49:35 27138 -
Telia 124 18.Jan.2018, Thu
806.0 MHz 15:32:59 - 16:32:50 23485 -
19.Jan.2018, Fri
08:54:34 - 09:54:34 26332 -
26.Apr.2018, Thu
11:00:00 - 11:59:59 2356 -
ice.net 78 27.Apr.2018, Fri
796.0 MHz 08:35:00 - 09:34:59 2205 -
30.Apr.2018, Mon -
08:13:00 - 09:12:59 1840 -
Table 2 Number of paging records with M-TMSIs
Network Number of Number of paging messages Number of paging
Operator paging messages with multiple M-TMSIs records with M-TMSIs
Telenor 160480 19533 181443
Telia 71616 5101 76955
ice.net 6154 242 6401
Table 3 Verification of M-TMSI refreshment
M-TMSI refreshed
Event
(Yes/No/Uncertain)
Telia ice.net
Mobile device switched off/on Yes Yes
Mobile flight mode on/off Yes Yes
Mobile originating voice call Yes No
Mobile terminating voice call Yes Yes
Mobile originating short message No No
Mobile terminating short message No No
Mobile originating data No No
Mobile terminating data No No
TA Change Yes Yes
Periodic TAU
Uncertain Yes
(no refresh in 48 hours) (refresh in less than 24h)
which circumstances the temporary identification is re-
freshed.
Table 3 shows the results. There are no results for
Telenor because the M-TMSI could not be read as ex-
plained in Subsection 3.3. As expected, switching the
mobile off and on, as well as turning the flight mode
on and off trigger the M-TMSI update. This is because
the mobile needs to re-attach to the network. Similarly,
voice calls (mobile originating and/or mobile terminat-
ing voice call) and moving from one TA to another trig-
ger M-TMSI reallocation. Events such as mobile origi-
nating and mobile terminating short messages or data
do not trigger refreshment of the M-TMSI. This is ex-
pectable, for example in LTE the frequency of data
transmission is high and this would trigger too much
activity in the network with no benefit for security. Fi-
nally, we tested if the M-TMSI is refreshed when the
UE camps on the same cell for several hours, with no
call activity. In this case, the refresh should be done pe-
riodically by a special procedure, at a timer expiration.
Expectedly, for ice.net the M-TMSI changed at least
three times in 24 hours to plausibly random values. Sur-
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Table 4 Smart paging analysis for Telenor
Neighbour Cells Cell 112 (816 MHz) Cell 298 (1830 MHz)
Time Range
19.01.2018 19.01.2018
15:32:26 - 16:09:19 15:29:58 - 16:07:29
Number of paging records 22752 8259
Number of paging records .
in both cells at the same time 1078
Distant Cells
Cell 243 (816 MHz) Cell 106 (816 MHz)
(≈ 2.2km) in the same TA
Time Range
27.01.2018 27.01.2018
16:15:00 - 17:15:59 16:15:00 - 17:15:59
Number of paging records 77318 39935
Number of paging records .
in both cells at the same time 0
Table 5 Smart paging analysis for Telia
Neighbour Cells Cell 124 (806 MHz) Cell 123 (806 MHz)
Time Range
20.01.2018 20.01.2018
10:37:25 - 11:19:30 10:38:57 - 11:19:24
Number of paging records 16648 3713
Number of paging records .
in both cells at the same time 2811
Distant Cells
Cell 124 (806 MHz) Cell 280 (806 MHz)
(≈ 2.2km) in the same TA
Time Range
27.01.2018 27.01.2018
19:37:00 - 20:37:59 19:37:00 - 20:37:59
Number of paging records 33675 33946
Number of paging records .
in both cells at the same time 0
prisingly, for Telia the M-TMSI remained unchanged in
a 48-hours time interval. How often a M-TMSI changes
in time is an operator specific decision, being a tradeoff
between security and efficiency. However, keeping the
temporary identity unchanged for such long periods can
threaten the privacy of the subscribers.
4.4 Smart Paging
To verify if smart paging is implemented, the paging
messages are captured simultaneously in at least two
cells within the same TA. Following the methodology,
the captured paging messages are decoded, then the
subscribers’ identities and the timestamps are extracted
and compared. For this experiment, we updated the
srsLTE source code to timestamp the captured paging
messages because the comparison should be done for
the same timestamp. Without smart paging, the pag-
ing records should be identical because the paging is
broadcasted within the whole TA. With smart paging,
the paging records should be different because the pag-
ing is only broadcasted in the latest cell the UE camped
on.
To achieve our goal, paging messages from two neigh-
bour cells, respectively paging messages from distant
cells (approximately 2.2km apart) but same TA, were
captured and analysed. The downlink frequencies re-
main the same as in Table 1: 816 MHz for Telenor and
806 MHz for Telia. Figure 8, adapted from Finnsenderen
[28], shows the geographical position of the capture and
the targeted cells for Telia and Telenor. The two neigh-
bour cells are both located in NTNU Gløshaugen cam-
pus. The distant cells are located in Moholt East.
Tables 4 and 5 illustrate the results for Telenor and
Telia respectively. Each table contains the total num-
ber of paging records in each cell, and the number of
Fig. 8 Locations of operator’s cells and message capture
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records that page the same UE and are broadcasted
in both cells simultaneously. The experiment result as-
sumes that the same S-TMSI is for the same UE during
the capturing period. For both Telia and Telenor, in the
case of the neighbour cells, the amount of records in one
cell is significantly less than in the other. This suggest
that one cell is used as a backup for the other. There
is an amount of records paging the same UE in the
neighbour cells at the same time, but there is no simul-
taneously paging to the same UE in the distant cells,
even if they are in the same TA. This means that both
Telenor and Telia use smart paging. This increases the
performance of the network by decreasing the number
of broadcasted messages, but in the same time increases
the risk of precise localisation of subscribers: a paged
UE can be located within the coverage of one cell, and
not at TA level.
Independently of our experiment, for which only si-
multaneously broadcast of paging messages is of inter-
est, there are some significant observations for the dis-
cussion. There were captured paging records for a UE
in one cell only, and later simultaneously pages records
for the same UE in both cells. This means that the UE
did not reply to the paging message in the first cell, so
it was paged on a broader area to increase the probabil-
ity to reach the target. There are also cases where after
paging a UE in one cell, a paging record for the same
UE was captured to the second cell only. This indicates
the movement of the UE from the first cell to the sec-
ond, raising up possibilities for an adversary to track
the movement of the UE in time, as long as the tempo-
rary identifier used for paging remains unchanged.
5 Conclusions
We described an experimental method to test the sub-
scribers’ privacy exposure by capturing and analysing
LTE paging messages. We verified by experiment that
paging messages can be captured and decoded by us-
ing only publicly available tools and minimal technical
skills. In terms of identities, we describe experiments to
test if mobile operators bring to minimum the usage of
the permanent identity of subscribers by adopting and
frequently updating the temporary identity. In terms
of localisation, we describe a method to verify if smart
paging is implemented. Smart paging increases perfor-
mance by decreasing the number of paging messages in
the network, but in the same time it brings the risks
of a more precise localisation of subscribers. All exper-
iments can be easily reproduced.
Following the experimental method described, we
performed a case study on three LTE mobile operators
in Norway. The results show that all operators protect
the privacy of the permanent identity by not exposing
it in paging messages. Moreover, our results show that
the temporary identity update is triggered by specific
events, in conformity to the 3GPP recommendations.
However, the same does not hold for all operators when
referred to the periodically update. Our experiments
indicate that there is an operator that does not refresh
the temporary identity in a 48 hours period.
To conclude, work must be done to reduce unpro-
tected pre-authentication traffic to minimum in the next
generation of mobile networks. Data capture is in gen-
eral hard to detect and mitigate, so mobile operators
must assure they implement the correct mechanisms to
mitigate attacks.
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